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Abstract
Quine (1960, ch.2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for trans-
lating or interpreting ordinary talk. ‘Rabbit’ might be taken to divide its reference over
rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly
affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his
famous ‘argument from below’ to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as
to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine’s claim have been
put forward in the past (see especially Evans, 1975; Fodor, 1993), and various patches have
been suggested (e.g. Wright, 1997). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find
any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be.
Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed
semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as ‘rabbit’ divide
their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quine’s rabbits), instantaneous temporal
slices of those continuants (Quine’s rabbit-slices) and the simple elements which compose
those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpreta-
tions on the table, we can get to work evaluating them.
∗Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Matti Eklund, Carrie Jenkins, Katherine Hawley, Andy McGo-
nigal, Daniel Nolan, Josh Parsons, Crispin Wright and others for discussions of specific elements of the paper
(not always under that mode of presentation). An ancestor of this paper was presented at the Metaphysics reading
group in St Andrews. Thanks to all present for discussion. I am particularly indebted to Wolfgang Schwarz, firstly
for providing the original version of the ‘dot theoretic’ semantics that I describe below, and secondly for extensive
discussion of many of the issues in this paper. They are not to be blamed.
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Might there be no fact of the matter which object ordinary names such as ‘London’ refer
to? Some indeterminacy in its reference would not be greatly surprising: for example, if it
turned out that ‘London’ was indeterminate in reference between various agglomerations of
land and housing with slightly different boundaries.1 Some philosophers have argued for much
more surprising indeterminacies: indeed, for results that might strike one initially as absurd or
paradoxical: some even argue that ‘London’ is indeterminate in reference between all objects
whatsoever.2 One does not have to go all the way to these extremes to find arguments for
surprising indeterminacies. Perhaps the most famous of all arguments for the indeterminacy
of reference—Quine’s discussion of ‘gavagai’—targets a fairly modest range of inscrutability.
These gavagai arguments contend that it is indeterminate whether predicates such as ‘gavagai’
or ‘rabbit’ divide their reference over temporal continuants, or over instantaneous temporal
slices of such continuants, or over undetached parts thereof.3
Gavagai arguments stand out amongst the range of arguments for inscrutability. The various
rival candidates to be the reference of ‘gavagai’: rabbits, rabbit-slices and undetached parts
thereof, are all ‘in and around’ the areas one would expect to find rabbits in. Utterances that
are causally related to four-dimensional continuant rabbits are typically also related to rabbit
slices and undetached rabbit parts (assuming such things exist).4 This means that the rival
interpretations considered in gavagai arguments involve no blatant violation of the sort of causal
constraints on reference that some take to be a central element of the metaphysics of reference.5
This makes the gavagai arguments challenging for a greater range of theorist than would be
worried with other types of inscrutability argument. Simply endorsing a theory of meaning that
builds in causal constraints would not be enough to remove the gavagai worries: there is no
avoiding engaging with the details.6
1This is one way of responding to an instance of Unger’s ‘problem of the many’ (Unger, 1980; McGee, 2005).
For a worry about this response, see Weatherson (2003), Williams (2006a).
2For arguments to this effect, see Quine (1964), Wallace (1977), Davidson (1979), Putnam (1981). For discus-
sion, see Field (1975), Lewis (1984), Hale andWright (1997), Williams (2007), Williams (2008) and the references
therein.
3I treat inscrutability arguments in general, and the gavagai arguments in particular, as arguing for indeter-
minacy in word-world interpretation relations. In this, I am following a rich tradition of relocating Quinean
considerations from their original home: see especially Field (1974), Evans (1976), Fodor (1993).
If one wishes to transpose one what follows back into a Quinean setting, one will have some more work to do,
though I take it no problems of principle would arise. To get a sense of how this would go, compare what follows
to the translation-based presentation of counterpart theory in (Lewis, 1968).
4In this respect, Gavagai arguments draw on the sort of issues that generate the so-called ‘qua’ problem for
causal theories of reference. See Sterelny (1990, ch.6.) for a survey of the latter issue.
5Quine himself, of course, seems to regard preservation of ‘stimulus synonymy’ as the principal constraint on
acceptable translation. Latter-day Quineans do not always follow him in this regard. For example, Field (1994),
defending a very Quinean combination of disquotational notions of truth and reference and important theoretical
roles assigned to translation, suggests inter alia that good translations should preserve approximate conceptual role
and causal ‘indication relations’ in which utterances stand.
6Arguments for extreme inscrutability mentioned earlier are committed to maintaining that among the optimal
candidate referents for ordinary names are objects that are not relevantly causally connected to the use of that
name. (If you want to say that it is not determinately the case that ‘London’ fails to refer to Betelgeuse, you better
not have any substantial causal constraints on reference.)
The upshot of this is that arguments for extreme inscrutability typically either have to presuppose e.g. that causal
connections between speaker’s utterances and objects play no role in fixing what the utterances refer to, or rely
on the notorious ‘just more theory’ maneuvers to argue that causal constraints can somehow be bypassed. (Thus,
they are most directly significant to interpretationist metasemantic theories (for example Davidson (1973), Lewis
(1974)) which often disregard causality in this way. (For explicit discussion and rejection of causal constraints, see
Lewis (1984); for discussion of the general class of views here, see Williams (2007).)
For the just-more-theory attempt to generalize the applicability of arguments for extreme inscrutability, see
Davidson (1977, 1979) and Putnam (1981, 1980). For a paradigmatic response, see Lewis (1984). For an alterna-
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Gavagai arguments for division-inscrutability are unexpected enough to shock, moderate
enough not to generate quite the sense of paradox of extreme inscrutability theses, and prima
facie robust in the face of a wide variety of positions on the metaphysics of meaning. They are
worthy, therefore, of study in their own right.
The plan in what follows is to take stock of putative counterexamples to the gavagai argu-
ments in the literature (section 1); to develop interpretations embedding the rival ‘divisions of
reference’ systematically and in detail (section 2); and to evaluate whether a prima facie case
for inscrutability in reference-division follows.
1 Evans and Fodor against the gavagai argument
Quine’s argument for inscrutability of the division of reference focuses on three candidate kinds
of entities which general terms like ‘rabbit’ or ‘gavagai’ might divide their reference over: con-
tinuant entities (which a four-dimensionalist such as Quine regards as composed of point-events
spread out over time); maximal instantaneous temporal parts of such entities; and undetached
parts thereof. Let us call these respectively ‘rabbit worms’, ‘rabbit slices’ and ‘undetached
rabbit parts’.7
Gareth Evans’ paper ‘Identity and Predication’ (1975) includes a subtle examination of
Quine’s argument from below. Of the points he makes, the ones of most interest to us simply
point to certain sentences that it is not clear how to handle within interpretations incorporating
strange reference-division.8
As Evans concedes in the final paragraph of his paper, he does not offer an assurance that no
semantic proposal will vindicate Quine. His methodology is rather to ‘try out’ some plausible
candidates and show that they break down. Since I will be developing detailed proposals in an
attempt to vindicate Quine (or at least put his case in its strongest form) it would be pointless
to examine in detail the views that Evans tries out. What we can usefully extract from the
consideration of Evans and others is a sense of the kind of problems that a semantic theory
incorporating strange reference-division must meet, and a range of test cases for the semantic
theories we shall propose.
The first set of Evansian objections concern the proposal whereby ‘Rabbit’ divides its ref-
erence over all and only undetached rabbit parts. Evans asks about the objects that supposedly
fall under adjectives such as ‘white’. He offers a trilemma:
tive take on the issue, see Field (1975).
7I use ‘rabbit worms’ rather than Quine’s rabbits, because it avoids the appearance of begging questions, and
also because these candidate interpretations should be intelligible to other theorists who would would recognize
the existence of the rabbit-worms (say under the title ‘the history of a rabbit) but would not wish to identify them
with rabbits. Both endurantists and the stage theorists to be discussed later might fall into this camp.
Throughout this paper, I will be presupposing a setting which allows all the entities required to formulate the
semantic theories I will present, one that Quine would have found very familiar: an eternalist, four-dimensionalist
metaphysics (more recent defenders of this metaphysics include Sider (2001a) and Lewis (1986), among many
others. This I take to be a setting where we can make the strongest case possible for Quinean division inscrutability:
but it should be borne in mind that challenging the metaphysical presuppositions might well be a way of the
viability of the interpretations to be presented.
8Evans makes several different kinds of points against the inscrutability arguments Quine offers. Some, for
example, involve clever ad hominem attacks on Quine (See the discussion of the identity of indiscernibles at Evans
(1975, p.113)). Others involve disputing the Quinean methodology for detecting predication and divided reference
in a language (The basic contention seems to be (1) that Quine misses the constraint of simplicity on semantic
theory. (2) That predicates should divide their reference over objects to whose spatial and temporal boundaries we
are sensitive. Evans seems to regard (1) as the more fundamental principle, and (2) as resulting from an application
of this principle. I will not discuss this further here.)
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• If all and only white things fall under ‘white’, then a brown rabbit with a white foot will
satisfy “white rabbit”.
• If all and only things which are parts of a white rabbit fall under ‘white’, then the con-
ditions of “white rabbit” will be fine, but the truth-conditions of “white house” will be
wrong.
• If all and only things which are parts of a white thing fall under ‘white’, we get white
rabbits and houses: but we overgenerate. A white rabbit foot is part of a white thing: on
the current proposal, we would have ‘white rabbit’ satisfied in the presence of a brown
rabbit with a white foot.
The Evansian question for any attempt to vindicate Quinean division-inscrutability is the
following:
(A) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting the division of ‘rabbit’ over undetached
rabbit parts can cope with the interaction of adjectives and general terms.
Fodor (1993), inspired by Evans, provides another challenge for the undetached rabbit part
proposal. Rather than looking to adjectives, he focuses on cases where we have predicates
both for a thing and for some distinctive part of that thing. The case he chooses is a language
containing both ‘rabbit’ and ‘ear’. There is nothing that is both an ear and a rabbit, but any
undetached part of a rabbit’s ear (say, the ear itself) will be an undetached part both of a rabbit,
and of an ear. Therefore, on a systematic Quinean proposal, it looks as if the following will be
true:
there is something that is both a rabbit and an ear.9
The strength of Fodor’s objection is that there seems no way that we can assign to ‘ear’ an
extension that does not include some rabbit parts: but any such overlap will render true the
strange generalization given above. Thus, we have a second challenge:
(B) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting alternative divisions does not generate false
positives in the context of a pair of general terms, one of which (intuitively) applies to a
part of the other.
In considering the rabbit-stage proposal, Evans focuses on tense. He maintains that either
one will end up with a situation where if there is any stage of the rabbit which satisfies ‘F’,
any stage of the rabbit at any time will satisfy ‘F’; or one will be able to render true ‘a rabbit
was running’ where the rabbit no longer exists. Here I am convinced by the rebuttals of Evans’
specific arguments in Wright (1997) and Richard (1997). The general challenge is well taken
however: a systematic development of the stage proposal will have to show how it is compatible
with tensed ascriptions.
(C) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting alternative divisions can cope with tensed
predications.
Having noted these concerns, I think that the best tactic to meet these concerns is to develop
a systematic semantic proposal for each candidate ‘division’ of reference. We can then evaluate
whether the challenges (A-C) that we have extracted from Evans and Fodor cause problems.
This is the burden of the following sections.
9Fodor’s concern is actually with the conjunctions “A is an ear and A is a rabbit” and “A is an ear and a rabbit”.
I think the existential generalization presents the harder case for the division inscrutabilist.
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2 Worms, stages, and undetached parts
The task of the present section is to spell out three candidate semantic theories for (a fragment
of) English. In the first, ‘rabbit’ divides its reference over four-dimensional rabbit-worms; in
the second, it divides its reference over three-dimensional (instantaneous) rabbit-stages. In the
third, it divides its reference over one-dimensional undetached rabbit parts or ‘dots’.10
In the literature on theories of persistence, semantic theories have been developed that suit
our purposes exactly. I will be appealing to the basic semantic framework of the perdurance the-
ory of persistence—“worm theory”, and the semantic framework of what Haslanger (2003) calls
the exdurance theory of persistence—the “stage theory” advocated by Sider (1996a, 2001a) and
Hawley (2001). For terminological convenience, I use ‘perdurance’ and ‘exdurance’ for the
metaphysical theories of what it takes for an ordinary object to persist through time; I will use
‘worm theory’ and ‘stage theory’ to refer to associated semantic views.
Some inscrutability arguments are based on formal results proving that candidate semantic
theories are ‘sententially equivalent’—assign the same semantic values to sentences (see espe-
cially the appendices to each of Putnam (1981), Hale andWright (1997) andWilliams (2006b)).
I do not believe this to be possible here.11 Mymethodology, rather, is one of providing a seman-
tics for a fragment of a language: albeit a rather rich one. In each case, it will be a first-order
intensional language with time and world indices, allowing modal and temporal operators to be
defined. A full defense would require extensions to a setting adequate for natural languages as
a whole. However, the present fragments provide more than enough material for the key issues
over division inscrutability—including those due to Evans and Fodor—to be formulated.
2.1 Worm theory
The perdurance theorists of persistence have two central theses—first, that ordinary objects like
candles and rabbits are perduring space-time worms; secondly, such things undergo alteration
in virtue of their stages successively possessing different properties. Haslanger outlines the
view:
On the perdurantist’s conception of persistence, an object persists through time in
a way analogous to how an object is extended through space. The candle is spa-
tially extended through its 7-inch length . . . by having parts at the different regions.
Likewise, according to the perdurantist, the candle is extended through time. . . by
having parts or stages at different times. . . . The notion of perdurance provides
the resources for a relatively straightforward account of alteration: . . . the persist-
ing candle is composed of temporal parts or stages that only briefly exist; distinct
candle-stages are the proper subjects of incompatible properties, being straight and
being bent, and the temporal composite which consists of the stages is the subject
of persistence. . . . On this account, persisting things are temporally extended com-
posites, also known as . . . space-time worms
(Haslanger, 2003, p.318)
10I do not think that there would be any objection to extending the account respectively to non-atomic rabbit
parts, or to more-than-instantaneous stages, but I shall not discuss this here.
11Wolfgang Schwarz (2005a) makes this claim for versions of the stage and dot theories below; but his versions
have richer semantic structure, and it is not clear that they can be described as involving predicates whose reference
is divided over undetached rabbit parts/stages rather than sets of such parts/stages. See also the discussion archived
at Schwarz (2005b).
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A semantic theory that accords with the perdurantist theory of persistence, then, would be
one where ‘rabbit’ divided its reference over rabbit-worms. Obtaining such a semantic theory
is not without its difficulties. In particular, it looks as if we have to discern two forms of pred-
ication, depending on whether the predicate at hand applies to a thing throughout its existence
(arguably including: rabbit, chair, person); or can apply to a thing at some times and not at
others (paradigmatic examples include ‘runs’, ‘is green’, ‘wobbles’, etc).
Following Parsons (2005), let us divide predicates into two sorts: s-predicates (e.g. ‘is a
rabbit’, ‘is a chair’, ‘is a person’, etc) and c-predicates (e.g. ‘is running’, ‘is green’ etc).12
Parsons presents his theory taking the notion of s- and c-predicates as primitive, and deals only
with the monadic case. To generalize to the polyadic case, we shall take predicates to be given
with an assignment of sorts (s and c) to their name-places. An s-predicate is then a monadic
predicate whose name-place is of sort s, and a c-predicate one whose name-place is of sort c;
but more generally, an n-place relation might have k places of sort s, and n− k places of sort c.
I will present the worm theory together with a counterpart theoretic treatment of modal
operators. There is no reason why the world-shifting operators should not be treated in other
ways, but I include it here because the stage and dot theories to be discussed later contain
formally similar apparatus.
A commitment of all the theories that follow will be the possibility of analyzing tenses into
a tenseless language—tense operators such as ‘was’ and ‘will be’ in terms of generalizations
over operators such as ‘at t’. For example “Was: φ” is true relative to 〈t,w〉 on I iff for some
time t ′ prior to the time of utterance, “At t ′: φ” is true at 〈t,w〉 on I. “It has always been that
φ” is true relative to 〈t,w〉 on I iff for every time t ′ prior to the time of utterance, “At t ′: φ” is
true at 〈t,w〉 on I.13 Assuming this has been accomplished, the challenge for our theories is to
provide a semantics for the ‘at t’ operator. Analogous remarks apply to modal operators such
as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’, which are to be defined in terms of an ‘at w’ operator; and (in
the case of dot theory), to location operators.
In what follows, we write |e|I for the semantic value of the expression e. A semantic theory
that allowed for indexical phenomena would give a story about how |e|I is determined by the
context in which e is uttered—we should therefore regard I as the assignment of content to
expressions in a given context. The modal operators are to be defined using a primitive symbol
of the frameworkCm, which may itself be indexical.14
• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ” is not true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪{c} where |c|I∗ exists
12The terminology here is intended to recall the distinction between ‘substance sortals’ and ‘characterizing
predicates’ of Wiggins (1980): but neither Parsons nor I wish to be committed to the Wigginsean understanding
of the distinction. Some features carry over: for example, an s-predicate F , will be something such that in order
to cease to be F , one must cease to be—a Wigginsean result. But, for example, no kind-essentialism need follow
from this. For discussion, see Parsons (op cit) for further discussion.
13See Parsons (op cit, appendix) for a sample translation of some temporal vocabulary into a tenseless language.
However see Dowty (1979, ch.3) for an argument that, to handle tense and aspect in English, we need not only
relativization to instants, but relativization to intervals of time. This is briefly discussed below.
14Notice also that I use the quasi-substitutional way of handling quantifiers found in BensonMates. In an already
complex presentation, this allows us to drop at least one of the respects in which truth is relativized.
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at 〈w, t〉.15
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
• “At t ′, φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is true relative to 〈w, t ′〉.
• “n is F” is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff either:
(1) F is a s-predicate and |“n”|I is a member of |“is F”|I; or
(2) F is a c-predicate and some t-stage of |“n”|I is a member of |“is F”|I .16
Worm theory reflects the perdurance view. Perdurance says that ordinary objects—things
like rabbits—are space time worms. Correspondingly, it is this kind of object that ‘rabbit’ or
‘gavagai’ divides its reference over.17 Perdurance theories say that a thing alters by having
successive temporal parts that instantiate different properties—and this is reflected in worm
theory by the account of c-predication, whereby a thing satisfies ‘is running’ at t, and fails to
satisfy it at t ′, by having temporal parts at those times that respectively do and do not fall under
the extension of ‘is running’.
2.2 Stage theory
Stage theoretic semantics reflects the exdurance theory of persistence advocated by Sider (1996a,
2001a) and Hawley (2001).
According to the [exdurance] theory, ordinary persisting objects are stages that per-
sist . . . by having distinct stage counterparts at other times. [Exdurance] says that
in the afternoon when I find my bent candle on the shelf, the candle is the bent-
stage coexisting with me then, but that stage persisted from before (in the relevant
sense) by virtue of having a (straight) counterpart stage on the shelf in the morn-
ing. . . . Although on this view ordinary objects are stages and so (strictly speaking)
only exist momentarily, they can nonetheless persist by virtue of having counterpart
antecedent and/or successor stages.
(Haslanger, 2003, p.318)18
15The quantifier is ‘ontologically loaded’ in the sense that it only ranges over objects at one time. I see no
reason why there should not be tenseless and ‘possibilist’ quantification where this restriction is lifted (it is easy
to see how the clauses would be altered). Likewise, one can imagine intensional operators which do not invoke
relations. We may be using such devices when we say “there is some German composer who is now famous”. (For
an alternative strategy, see (Cresswell, 2004)).
16More generally, if we have a polyadic predicate R, with k s-places and l c-places then “Rn1, . . .nk,m1 . . .ml”
is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff 〈n1, . . . ,nk,m′1, . . . ,m′l〉 is a member of |“is F”|I , where m′i is some t-stage of mi, for
each i.
Note that we will now have a variety of relations with claim to be the identity relation a = b, according to
whether a and b are regarded as of sort s or sort c. This leads to real differences in the context of counting.
17Or at least, it will do so so long as we regard ‘gavagai’ as what Wiggins would call a ‘pure sortal’, and not, for
example, a phase of the underlying sortal ‘organism’. In the former case, ‘gavagai’ will be a s-predicate, holding
of all rabbit-worms; in the latter case, ‘gavagai’ will be divide its reference over rabbit-stages. See Parsons (op cit)
and the references therein.
18Haslanger (2003) uses ‘exdurance’ and ‘stage theory’ interchangeably. I find it useful to regiment the termi-
nology to distinguish metaphysical from semantic theories, and have altered the above quote accordingly.
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The key features of the exdurance theory are that ordinary objects are strictly speaking
momentary stages, persisting vicariously through their counterparts located elsewhere in time;
and that things change their properties through having counterpart-stages at successive times
instantiating different properties.
To set up stage theoretic semantics to reflect the exdurance theory of persistence and alter-
ation, we need an additional primitive: the two-place relation Ct (“is a temporal counterpart
of”). This holds between temporal slices. Intuitively, Ct(x,y) will hold if x and y are stages of
the same persisting object—in the case at hand, if they are stages of the same rabbit.
• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is not true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪{c} where |c|I∗ exists
at 〈w, t〉.
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
• “At t ′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t ′〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} andCt(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at〈w, t ′〉.
• “n is F” is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff
|“n”|I ∈ |“F”|I .19
This stage theory reflects the exdurance view. Exdurance says that ordinary objects—things
like rabbits—are momentary stages. Correspondingly, ‘rabbit’ or ‘gavagai’ divides its reference
over this kind of object. Exdurance theories say that a thing alters in virtue of distinct coun-
terparts having distinct properties —and indeed, we find that “a rabbit was running and is now
sitting still” will be true iff some present rabbit-stage that falls under “sitting still” has a past
temporal counterpart that falls under “is running”.
2.3 Dot theory
When it comes to undetached rabbit parts, there is no corresponding theory in the literature to
draw on. One can see what such a theory would look like, however: it would be a theory of
extension through space that paralleled the exdurance theory of persistence through time. On
such a view, a rabbit that is partially at a position p would extend through space, not by having
parts located at other places, but through having counterparts at those positions.
19The generalization to polyadic predicates is not immediate. In particular, we would like to be able to handle
crosstemporal relations—for example “William I was the ancestor of Elizabeth II”. The problem is that there may
be no single instant where both relata have counterparts. However, nothing in the above requires that the objects
in the extension of a predicate to exist at a single time. If we adopt this setup, then there is no objection to having
〈William,Elizabeth〉 within the extension of ‘is an ancestor of’. If the temporal operator featuring in the above
is construed as ranging over past intervals, and counterparts need only exist at some time during that interval, no
problems should arise.
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We can modify the stage theoretic ideas to get a corresponding semantic theory, which I
shall call ‘dot theory’.20 As before, we have primitive counterpart relations Cm, Ct , and in
addition a relation Cp relating one object to another at a single time. In the case at hand, the
intended relation will hold of the pair x,y if they are parts of the same rabbit (stage).
• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff “φ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on
I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff “φ” is not true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪ {c} on which |c|I∗ exists at
〈w, t, p〉.
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t, p〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} such thatCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
• “At t ′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t ′, p〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCt(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w, t ′〉.
• “At p′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t, p′〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} where for each i, |c∗i |I
∗
whereCp(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at p′.
• “ n is F” is true relative to 〈w, t, p〉 iff
|“n”|I ∈ |“F”|I21
We can now let the extension of “Rabbit” or “Gavagai” be all and only mereologically
atomic undetached parts of a rabbit.22 An atomic part falling under ‘gavagai’ will extend in
space vicariously through having positional-counterparts in other places. It will change its
properties through space through (for example) having white counterparts in one place; and
counterparts in another place that are black.23
2.4 The primitives
One of the most striking things about the move from worm to stage to dot semantics is the need
to appeal to additional primitives in each case. For worm theory, we appealed to the counter-
part relation Cm (and recall, this was inessential—we could have used some other treatment of
modality if preferred.). For stage theory we have in addition the temporal counterpart relation
Ct , and for dot theory, we also have the positional-counterpart relation Cp.
20Wolfgang Schwarz (2005a), discusses an ‘atomistic’ theory he calls ‘general counterpart theory’. The version
presented here derives from an early version of Schwarz’s paper though with some variations to parallel more
exactly the counterpart theoretic paraphrases of Lewis (1968). Schwarz has subsequently reformulated his theory
in ways that are less congenial to my present purpose.
21To deal with cross-temporal and spatial relations, similar moves to that used in stage theoretic setup will be
needed.
22To get arbitrary undetached parts within the extension of ‘gavagai’, as on Quine’s original proposal, we would
need to combine elements of the dot theory with elements of the worm theory. I will not give details here.
23For purposes of exposition, we indulge in the fiction that mereological atoms are intrinsically coloured.
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The modal counterpart relation as Lewis understands it, is a contextually inconstant relation,
so that statements about necessary properties (and de re modal predication in general) become
highly sensitive to peculiarities of conversational context.24 Lewis thinks of the counterpart
relation as being fixed by facts about the similarity of objects to others. Although facts about
similarity are not treated as in any way subjective by Lewis, which respects of similarity are
called upon in a given case will depend on the demands of the conversation.25
The formal appeal to ‘counterpart’ relations, however, does not commit us to anything sub-
stantive of this kind. For example, it as yet says nothing about whether we can further analyze it
(as Lewis analyzes modal counterparthood in terms of similarity); or whether we should treat it
as primitive. Even in the modal case, compatibly with all that has been said, which objects are
the modal counterpart of one another might depend on their instantiating special ‘haecceities’
(individual essences). This could lead to a treatment of modal predication very different from
Lewis’, though sharing the same formal setting.
Appreciating the distinction between the flexibility of the formal apparatus of counterpart
theory and the particular doctrines endorsed by its inventor is important when thinking of the
stage and dot theoretic versions. It may help to think of the stage-theorist’s “temporal coun-
terpart relation” as a relation of temporal unity. Every participant in the current debate owes a
story about how stages hang together to form continuing objects, even if this only amounts to
taking the notion of a ‘natural united’ object as primitive. This ‘hanging together’ is exactly
whatCt expresses (cf Hawley, 2001, ch.3).26
We can categorize ‘substantive’ accounts of the counterpart relations in numerous cross-
cutting ways: (1) It could be taken as primitive, or an analysis could be offered. (2) It could be
constant—a single relation-in-extension no matter what the context is; or inconstant—which
relation-in-extension is picked out byCt might vary.27 (3) Further, grades of inconstancy might
arise. One might hold that there are only two temporal counterpart relations; say counterpart-
qua-body and counterpart-qua-person.28 Or, like Lewis, one might think of endless counterpart
relations, whose selection is highly dependent on context. (4) On an inconstant view, one might
hold that distinct counterpart relations are associated with each sortal predicate (so that sortal
predicates ‘carry with them’ criteria of diachronic persistence)29; or one might not endorse such
a connection. (5) One might think of the counterpart relations as subjectively constituted—for
example, in terms of the classificatory dispositions of agents; or objectively constituted—for
example, in terms of objective similarity (in the modal case)30 or constitutive causal relations
(in the temporal case)31. Of course, the modal, temporal and part counterpart relations may
require analysis in different ways.
My concern here has been solely to set up the formal frameworks of three semantic theories
that develop Quine’s suggestions for what ‘rabbit’ or ‘gavagai’ might divide its reference over.
For the purposes of mounting a Quinean argument for division-inscrutability, all we need is that
some version or other of each of these three frameworks succeeds. Though I shall occasionally
24Lewis (1968), Lewis (1986, §4.5)
25Lewis (1983). Perhaps the most extreme example of Lewis endorsing context-sensitivity is to be found in
“Things qua truthmakers” (2003).
26On a role for similarity in uniting successive stages, see Lewis (1976). It is clear that similarity will not find
much use in an account of the p-counterpart relation involved in dot theories.
27As Parsons (2005) notes (in a slightly different context), the kind of views on diachronic identity espoused by
Ayers (1974) and Armstrong (1980) may lead to a constant temporal unity relation.
28A picture that suits this case is one where we appeal to a small number of temporal unity relations, each paired
with a specific natural kind. Hawley (2001, ch.3, esp. p.70).
29See Hawley (2001, §5.5)
30See Lewis (1986, p.254)
31See Armstrong (1980)
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fill out the proposal in one direction or another, in the present context neutrality is a virtue, and
one that I shall seek to preserve as far as possible.
3 Objections
Having developed our candidate semantic theories as an attempt to make good on Quine’s argu-
ment for division-inscrutability, we can begin to assess whether each semantic theory fits with
ordinary patterns of assent and dissent. It is exactly the contention of Evans and Fodor that the
Quinean ‘rabbit stage’ and ‘undetached rabbit part’ proposals fail to fit with aspects of natural
language use.
I shall first cover Evans’ concerns about how stage-division handles tense ((C) on 4, above).
Second, I look at concerns arising in the literature on stage theories of persistence, over whether
the view handles counting correctly. Lastly, I look at the predication-based objections to rabbit-
part-division that Evans suggests and Fodor develops ((A) and (B) on 4, above).
3.1 Tense and aspect within stage theory
Worm, stage and dot theory each include temporal operators in terms of which tenses can be
defined. Evans’ concerns about the ability of the stage-view to deal with tensed attributions can
thus be answered in the most satisfying way: by appealing to a general treatment of tense. For
example, the past tense ‘there was a rabbit running along’ becomes:
(∃t)(t is past∧At t(∃x)(x is a rabbit∧ x is running along)32
The more general concern, however, may still be a good one. Evans highlights the need
for a systematic account of tenses in English. Though tenses (strictly construed) can be han-
dled, it is not so clear that other forms of temporal relativization will be. It is not clear at first
glance whether the stage view can handle temporal aspect.33 More particularly, as currently
formulated, stage theory allows relativization to instants in time only. However, this may be
inadequate to provide semantics for natural language. Dowty (1979, ch.4.) claims that to han-
dle, for example, the English progressive (‘John was crossing the road’) we need to appeal to
relativization to intervals.34
In fact, we can make a case for relativization to intervals more directly. Consider ‘John read
War and Peace yesterday’ (McCawley, 1980, p.345). For this to be true, it is not enough that
there be a time instant yesterday at which John was reading the book (for that is compatible
with him not finishing it), nor that be a time instant yesterday at which John finished reading
the book (since that would be consistent with his having only read the final page yesterday).
Various more complex analyses might be tried, but, having considered several such analyses,
McCawley writes:
32Essentially, the flaw in Evans’ original argument lies in failing to distinguish what Sider (1996a) calls de re
and de dicto temporal predications: ∃xWASFx vs. WAS∃xFx. This is effectively the objection to Evans offered in
Wright (1997) and Richard (1997).
33Josh Parsons mentioned this puzzle to me as a known problem for the Sider/Hawley stage theory of persistence.
However, I have not been able to locate a reference within the literature on stage theory.
34. The basic idea is that ‘John is crossing the road’ is true relative to a time T if there is a interval T ′ including
T relative to which ‘John crossed the road’ holds. This needs modification, though, to deal with the so-called
‘imperfective paradox’: ‘John was crossing the road’ can be true in situations where he never finished crossing
(e.g. because he was run over). See Dowty (op cit) for discussion.
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I would like to propose that not only points in time but also intervals figure in the
logical structures of sentences and that examples such as [those above] all involve
time intervals. [‘John readWar and Peace yesterday’] will then not say that there is
a past time at which John read War and Peace but that there is a past time interval
such that he read it on that interval.
(McCawley, 1980, p.345)35
Let us suppose that the analysis of tense and aspect involves irreducible interval-relativization,
as McCawley and Dowty urge. To begin with, one might think that no new problem arises for
stage theory. Division over rabbit stages seems in good order, since we can simply re-interpret
the stage semantics of p.8 above, so that the temporal indices range over intervals rather than
instants. Formally, everything else remains the same—for example, the extension assigned to a
predicate at an interval will be a set of instantaneous temporal parts. The thought will be that
relative to the interval during which John read War and Peace (say, 1am to 11pm) each John-
stage within the interval will fall under “readsWar and Peace”, whereas relative to a time when
he only got through half of it, no John-stage will fall under that predicate.36
We have to tread carefully though. On the stage-view, all that falling under a predicate
relative to a time comes to is falling under a predicate (the effect of the final clause of the
semantic theory is exactly to drop the relativization.) McCawley’s distinction between ‘a past
time at which John readWar and Peace’ and ‘a past interval such that John readWar and Peace
on that interval’ simply have no place within the stage-theoretic framework. (In the worm
theoretic account, by contrast, we could generate such a distinction by distinguishing between
temporal stages of John and temporally extended segments of John being in the extension of a
predicate).
In my view this does show that the stage framework as formulated stands in need of supple-
mentation. We need, as in the worm case, to distinguish between s-predicates (such as ‘being a
rabbit’) and c-predicates (such as ‘readingWar and Peace). The final clause of the analysis can
remain the same for s-predicates. But for c-predicates, we need to retain relativizations to times
(both instants and intervals):
• “n is F” is true relative to 〈w,T 〉 on I iff
(i) F is a s-predicate and |“n”|I ∈ |“F”|I; or
(ii) F is a c-predicate and |“n”|I ∈ |“F”|I relative to T .37
35See also Dowty (1979, ch.3.).
36Related predicates, such as the progressive ‘is reading War and Peace’ will hold of John-stages at instants
during that day, given an appropriate treatment of the progressive (Dowty, 1979, ch.4.).
37For the Quinean, who is primarily interested in what sortals divide their reference over, this seems fine. But
can one interested in stage theory as an account of persistence exploit this maneuver? The traditional worry over
allowing the truth-conditions of atomic predications to be relativized to a time is that it amounts to thinking of
certain properties that objects have as really relations to times. The worry is that this does not do justice to the
sense in which certain properties are intrinsic or non-relational. The traditional formulations of stage and worm
theory, with their time-relativization-free truth conditions for atomic predications, remove this worry.
Of course, the present proposal does not relativize ‘Mopsy is a rabbit’ to times, so for all that has been said,
‘being a rabbit’ might still be intrinsic or non-relational (see however, Sider (2001b)). But there does appear to be
a threat that redness or squareness will be represented as time-relativized.
I do not think that one should be worried about this, however. To begin with, since these predicates do not
express ‘activities’ of the kind that give rise to worries about progressive tense, we may not need to exploit the
richness of relativization to intervals. We could just count them as s-predicates (to do so would we would have to
drop the intuitive gloss, helpful in the worm case, that s-predicate means something like ‘sortal predicate’). But
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Since the issues over progressive tenses, etc, that motivated the move to introduce interval-
relativization don’t arise for s-predicates such as ‘is a rabbit’, I take it that this setting is ade-
quate.
3.2 Counting rabbits
Objections to stage-division do not come exclusively from the literature on Quine. One par-
ticular ‘internal’ criticism of the stage theory of persistence seems especially pertinent to our
purposes. This is the accusation that stage theory delivers intuitively bad results when counting
entities over an extended period.38 The intuitive objection is that, since the reference of ‘rabbit’
is divided over infinitely many instantaneous rabbit stages, it will say that there are infinitely
many rabbits in the hutch during a period in which common sense tells us that there is only one.
A standard Quinean response to such moves would be to re-interpret the ‘apparatus of indi-
viduation’: to declare that under the stage-hypothesis, we do not count by identity but by some
ersatz relation.39 That is, instead of characterizing the extension of ‘is identical to’ through
numerical identity, we characterize it using the counterpart-hood relation. Writing ‘I’ for short,
we let ‘xIy’ be true relative 〈w,T 〉 iff Ct(x,y) holds. Under this interpretation, we will not get
errors of counting, since if (intuitively) Mopsy alone is in the hutch during Tuesday, all the
rabbits in the hutch during that period are I-related.
Sider (1996a) declares it a virtue of stage theory that one does not have to do this, but can
stick with the interpretation of the ‘is’ of identity as strict, numerical identity. However, he
does think that re-interpretation is needed to get sensible results when, for example, counting
the number of rabbits in a hutch over an extended period of time.40
For the Quinean, however, counting by I seems entirely unproblematic. Moreover, it is not
obvious that we are re-interpreting identity using I. After all, I only relates things that are, will
be or were numerically identical.41 I conclude that the Quinean, at least, has no worries about
counting.42
even if we did count them as c-predicates, just because the predicate has relativized truth-conditions, it does not
mean it expresses a temporally relativized property. Call c-predicates where the same stages are in the extension of
a predicate relative to every temporal interval “stable predicates’. ‘Red’ and ‘Square’ would seem on this view to
be stable predicates. And I do not see any reason to think that stable predicates cannot express intrinsic properties,
despite the extra flexibility build into their truth-conditions.
38See in particular Sider (1996a), who despite defending stage theory is particularly concerned about this point.
39See Field (1974) for an example of this Quinean approach. Sider (1996a) endorses re-interpretation of identity
for particular ‘counting’ contexts.
40It is not obvious that counting by = itself will straightforwardly deliver bad results, once we factor in the
tense and aspect within counting statements. However, I do think that, particularly taking into account the interval
quantification just mentioned, it faces severe problems. In particular, we need to check that a proposal handles
the following case correctly: Flopsy is in a hutch during the early part of Tuesday; then taken out and destroyed.
Mopsy is created, occupies the hutch during the late part of Tuesday, and then is destroyed. On Wednesday, there
should be a reading of ‘there were two rabbits in the hutch during Tuesday’ which is true. The challenge for one
who wishes to ‘count by =’ is to show how the formulation of counting that handles this case correctly can also
deliver the intuitively correct results when the reference of ‘rabbit’ is divided over stages.
41In particular, this is not the ‘counting by rabbit-worms’ that Sider (1996a) appeals to. In the famous case, ‘the
Statue=the Clay’ will be true, for example, in virtue of their present stages being identical (and so counterparts),
whereas they may well be distinct worms. A better description would be ‘counting by ersatz identity’, since we
can regard counterpart-hood as the stage theorist’s substitute for diachronic identity.
42This analysis also deliver interesting results in so-called ‘fission’ cases (Sider, 1996b; Lewis, 1976). If Mopsy
undergoes fission, splitting amoeba-like to become Mopsy1 and Mopsy2, then Mopsy1 and Mopsy2 will witness
the truth of ‘there are at least two rabbits in the hutch during Tuesday’ (there are two rabbits—a Mopsy-1-stage
and a Mopsy-2-stage who are not I-related). The interesting result, however, is that we may get ‘there is exactly
one rabbit in the hutch during Tuesday’ coming out true as well. The point is that there is a rabbit within that hour
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3.3 Predication and compounding
We have considered and rejected the Evansian accusation that stage theory does not deliver
an adequate account of tense; and have pointed to a version of stage-semantics which avoids
any trouble with counting entities over an extended period. The final style of objection to be
considered focus, in the first instance, on alleged bad results of compound predications.
The source of these worries are the Evans and Fodor objections (A) and (B) (given on page
4ff. above.). Let us quickly update those concerns to the current setting. The natural proposal
for the dot-semantics is to let anything which is (intuitively) an atomic part of an F fall under
‘F’. Given this, prima facie problems with compound predications arise: we will have objects
that fall under ‘Rabbit’ and ‘White’ and ‘Ear’ when faced with a rabbit with a white ear—just
take any simple part of the ear. So there is at least a prima facie case that such a situation
witnesses the truth of ‘there is a white rabbit present’: to which no ordinary user of English
would assent.
Rather than tackle the problem directly, I want to outline a range of parallel cases within the
worm and stage frameworks, and describe how advocates of those positions are likely to react
to the challenges. I will then look at how the analogous responses would work within the dot
semantics.
Inconstancy within stage and worm theory
Consider stage theory, as developed by Sider (1996a). The proposal is to let any stage of
something that is intuitively an F fall under the extension of ‘F’. The temporal counterpart
relation is something that unites person-stages of a single person: Sider takes it to be a matter of
psychological connectedness. In the case of other kinds of objects, different kinds of temporal
‘unity’ relations would be needed. Our worries will arise when two objects which share a stage
nevertheless call for extensionally distinct counterpart relations.
Let us illustrate this with a famous case. Consider a lump of clay that has existed for millions
of years, and which was formed into a statue 35 years ago. Many wish to maintain that the statue
came into existence when the clay was formed into the shape of a statue—it is an object in its
own right, not merely a temporary property of the lump of clay.
From the stage theorist’s perspective, this presents a dilemma. Does the temporal coun-
terpart relation relate the present statue/clay stage to a stage of the piece of clay before it was
formed into a statue? Suppose it does: then the statue pre-existed its sculpting, in virtue of
having a temporal counterpart before that event. Suppose it does not: then the piece of clay has
no counterparts before the sculpting, so came into existence at that point also.
(a pre-fission stage of Mopsy) which is I-related to every rabbit in the hutch within the day. There are two familiar
ways of handling ‘there is exactly one F’ within first-order logic:
there is at least one F and it is not the case that there are at least two Fs
there is at least one F and every other F is identical to it
On the former reading the Mopsy-fission scenario will not make-true ‘there is exactly one rabbit in the hutch’. But
on the latter reading, the Mopsy-fission will make-true both ‘there is exactly one rabbit in the hutch’ and ‘there are
exactly two rabbits in the hutch’. Many will take these results to show that in this context, the first order analysis of
numerically definite quantification should be endorsed. Personally, though, I find the consequences of the second
analysis quite appealing—an apt reflection of the confusing nature of counting in fission cases.
Two final remarks. The proof that the two readings of ‘there is exactly one F’ are equivalent relies on the
Euclidean property of the identity relation: and it is exactly this that fails when numerical identity is replaced by
the ersatz identity I. Thanks to NN for this point. A similar treatment of fission cases will arise within worm
theory, if the name-positions flanking the identity sign are treated as c-predicates (cf. p.6, above.). Thanks to MM
for suggesting this.
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Sider’s analysis of the statue/clay case is to admit two temporal counterpart relations: statue-
counterparthood and lump-of-clay-counterparthood. The latter relates the statue/clay stage to
entities pre-existing the sculpting event; the former does not. Which relation is designated by
our relation Ct is a matter for context to decide. When we ask about the creation of the statue,
the former is invoked; when we ask about the pre-existence of the clay, the latter is invoked.
What we have described thus far is sufficient to deal with questions phrased in terms of
quantification (existence) and temporal operators. Using such devices we can ask about whether
the statue existed 36 years ago, and get one answer; and we can ask about whether the clay
existed 36 years ago and get a different answer. This is compatible with maintaining that the
statue and the clay are identical.
What I now want to highlight is that this does not solve all the problems that we need to
ask. For there are predicates that depend on the distribution of properties over the course of an
object’s history. Such ‘historical’ predicates include, paradigmatically ‘is exactly 35 years old’
and ‘is millions of years old’. Again, a dilemma emerges: is it true to say “there is a million
year old statue present”? Presumably not, given that the lump of clay was formed into a statue
only 35 years ago. Nevertheless, since the lump of clay stage is identical to the statue stage, if
one is within the extension of “millions of years old” the other must be too. We do want “there
is a lump of clay present that is millions of years old” to come out as true: so we are pressured
towards admitting the former sentence as true. Given that exactly similar remarks could be
made in favour of placing the stage inside the extension of “is exactly 35 years old” we are in
danger of declaring true “there is something that is both exactly 35 years old and is millions of
years old”.
One option here is to appeal to paraphrase so as to reduce the problem to one already solved.
The basic idea is to map
n is (at least) 35 years old
to
Throughout the past 35 years, n has existed.
As before, inconstancy of the counterpart relation directly impacts here, given the way that
temporal operators are defined.
The fundamental objection in the context of finding a possible semantic analysis of our lan-
guage, is that the free use of paraphrase to turn predicates into operators looks illegitimate. If
we are asking for a semantics for a language with a fixed syntax, we need some other device:
for we want an interpretation of the predicate ‘is 35 years old’. Pointing to an operator that
systematically corresponds to it is not to deliver this.43 The resolution is close to hand, how-
ever. What we must maintain is that not only the counterpart relation, but a range of related
predicates are inconstant or indexical. ‘Historical’ predicates such as ‘is exactly 35 years old’
are paradigmatic examples of this class. Indeed, the two indexicals are related in a natural way:
‘is exactly 35 years old’ will hold of a stage at t iff the sum of the temporal counterparts of that
stage existing earlier than t measures 35 years. Notice that we use the counterpart relation in
specifying the property. Hence any indexicality characteristic of the counterpart relation will
infect the extension of the predicate.44 We get:
The statue is the clay
43What we would need to make a principled case is some independently motivated transformation or generative
component in the semantics that would derive the surface predicate from underlying operators. Cf. Lewis (1970)
and Dowty (1979, ch.1.).
44Compare the ‘indexical’ response to Evans suggested by Wright (1997, p.410).
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The statue is exactly 35 years old
The clay is millions of years old.
To explain the difference, we point to changes in context: the latter two invoke different coun-
terpart relations (statue-counterparthood and clay counterparthood respectively) which in turn
changes the extension of the relevant predicates.
The residual question
Our resolution of the puzzles over inconstant predication make heavy use of contextually vary-
ing counterpart relations. This leaves a residual worry. For simplicity, I set up the semantics
within a single context, and assumed that this context would determine a unique counterpart
relation. It is natural to think, however, that different counterpart relations can be invoked by
different parts of the same sentence. Thus (naming the statue ‘Goliath’ and the clay ‘Lump’) it
is natural to think the following should come out true.
Goliath is exactly 35-years old and Lump is millions of years old (*)
For this to be the case, we need to allow different counterpart relations to operate in the two
conjuncts. Two worries then emerge: How are we to think of this case? What prevents us from
existentially generalizing to get the problems back once again?
On the first point, we should first note that we have independent reason to think that context-
change within a sentence can take place. Consider the utterance “Now is not. . . now” Since the
second utterance of ‘now’ takes place at a later time than the first, there is a natural reading of
the sentence on which it expresses a truth. On the other hand, relative to any single context, it
expresses a contradiction. I suggest the following view of how token utterances get assigned
truth-conditions by a semantics. First, each expression in the utterance has its own context.
The first component to semantic theory (what Kaplan (1989) calls ‘character’) will assign to
each component a content, depending on its own unique context. Indexical terms such as ‘I’
and ‘now’ are assigned a referent, indexical predicates are assigned an extension, and so on.
Once this is fixed, the second component of semantic theory kicks in. This tells us how the
referents and extensions assigned to the various expressions combine to determine the overall
truth-conditions for the sentence. The various semantic theories that we give above are each
candidates for this second component. Which extension the predicates have, or what precise
relation the primitive terms of the theory express, may indeed vary depending on the context at
hand, even within the same sentence.45
The second worry seems to me the most serious challenge. What prevents the worrying
existential generalization:
There is something that is both exactly 35 years old and is millions of years old?
We have been given no reason to think that context cannot change in ways that render true
an utterance of such a sentence. The case is particularly pressing given our verdict that the
witnessing statement (∗), above, is unproblematic.
45For more examples of how context change within a sentence can be significant, see Lewis (1979). The account
of belief reports in Stalnaker (1999) also requires context change. It seems to me that the need to distinguish
contextual determination of content, involving a variety of contexts, from the calculation of truth-conditions of a
given utterance, once content of its parts have been fixed, undermines Lewis (1980)’s suggestion that we could do
semantics entirely in terms of a single binary functions from index and context to truth-values. It gives a principled
reason for discerning a significant level of ‘content’ within the overall ‘semantic value’.
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There are two responses. The way of resistance is to find some principled constraint on
change of context which prevents the generalization from coming out true. It is hard to see
a non ad hoc route for this. Better, then, is the way of concession. This is to accept that
there is no principled reason that a context cannot be found with respect to which the existential
generalization is true; but to insist that such contexts do not normally arise, so that standardly the
existentially generalized sentence expresses something false. One would then hope to explain
away intuitions that the statement is false, on the grounds of its typical (though not inevitable)
falsity.
I advise the stage theorist to take the way of concession. One should try to explain intuitive
resistance to the bare existential by noting that for it to be true, context would need to invoke
statue-counterparthood for the first part of the sentence, and clay-counterparthood in the second.
However, there are no prompts for such change in the sentence. If we do add such prompts, we
get something that sounds (to my ears at least) acceptable:
there is something that is exactly 35 years old (qua statue) and millions of years old
(qua lump of clay).
Analogues in the worm case
I have explored the way that Sider handles statue/clay cases within stage theory. The key was
to diagnose inconstancy in the counterpart relation, and to extend this to relevant ‘inconstant’
predication. I now want to briefly sketch the analogous case within worm theory, before turning
to the Evans/Fodor objections to Quinean inscrutability.
Worm theory, as we have set it up, puts fusions of temporal stages of Fs into the extension
of ‘F’, when F is a s-predicate, and puts G-ing stages into the extension of ‘G’, when G is a
c-predicate. It straightforwardly handles the whole variety of cases we have hitherto consid-
ered.46 Nevertheless, analogous phenomena do arise, given modal counterpart theory. It is not
unreasonable to hold that the statue is essentially a statue. Equally, it is not unreasonable to
hold that the lump of clay is essentially made of clay, but might never have been made into a
statue.47 On the other hand, if we consider a case where the statue and the clay were created
and destroyed at the same time, on the worm-view the statue and the clay will be the same
space-time worm.
Lewis (1986, §4.5) explicitly admits this kind of case, by making allowance for inconstant
modal counterpart relations.48 Lewis’s thought is that in some contexts, a shapeless lump of
clay can be similar enough to the statue-clay worm (e.g. regarding history) to count as its
counterpart; but in other contexts, the relevant standards of similarity are such that only statues
can be counterparts, even if they are made of bronze or steel. We can retrace the steps described
earlier for the stage case: pointing to possible paraphrase in terms of modal operators to which
the modal counterpart relations are directly relevant (e.g. ‘Necessarily, it is a statue’); and
then looking at an interpretation of the predicate ‘is essentially a statue’ specified in terms of
counterpart relations, so that it would inherit the indexicality of the latter.
Again, there would be problematic existential generalizations:
there is something that is both essentially a statue; and is essentially made of clay,
but might never have been a statue
46This has the rather disarming implication that, strictly speaking, nothing is both white and a rabbit. Of course,
the semantics of predicates are set up in such a way that ‘everything that is a white rabbit is a rabbit’ will come out
true.
47Kripke (1980, ch.2)
48Indeed, his is the model that Sider follows in developing the stage view.
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Again, we try to allay worries by noting how odd the context-change involved would have to
be to render this true; and also, perhaps, the acceptability of versions where contextual prompts
such as qua statue are introduced.
The Evans and Fodor cases revisited
Having explored modal and temporal inconstancy in the worm and stage cases, I will now
argue that Evans/Fodor objections are just the surfacing of the same phenomenon within the
dot-semantics. Consider first Evans’ challenge: of what objects does ‘white’ hold? The under-
lying problem here is that whether or not a rabbit is white depends on the overall distribution
of whiteness in its fur. Like the historical predicates that were problematic for stage theory,
‘spatialized’ predicates will pose challenges for dot theory.
The solution is to characterize the extension of predicates informally via the contextually
salient counterpart relation:
‘is white’ applies to a iff the fusion of a and its positional-counterparts have a white
outer surface.
When ‘rabbit-counterparthood’ is salient, all atomic parts of a single rabbit are counterparts
of each other. In the presence of a white rabbit, the condition will be met by any part of a white
rabbit. It is not met by any part of a black rabbit with a white ear. It is not met even if there
is an atomic part A (part of the ear of the rabbit) which falls under ‘rabbit’ and which is itself
intrinsically white in colour.
Each such sortal will have to deliver its own counterpart relation. For example, there will be
ear-counterparthood, under which x and ywill be counterparts iff they are both parts of the same
rabbit ear. In the scenario sketched above, the same object A which did not fall under ‘white’
under the rabbit-counterparthood relation, will fall under ‘white’ under ear-counterparthood.
I hope it is clear that the above is just the analogue of the treatment of inconstant predicates
in the modal and stage settings: though now almost every predicate is inconstant. We can
expect an analogue of the odd existential generalizations found earlier. In the current setting
these generalizations are something like:
There is something that is both white all over and mostly black
For A, above, is white all over qua part of a white-all-over ear; and mostly black, qua part of
a mostly black rabbit. Again, our initial discomfort might be explicable given the changes of
context that must occur to render the odd-sounding sentence true; and might be disarmed if we
find the ‘qua’ glosses moderately acceptable.
The situation is interestingly different with the Fodor cases, where we concentrate on sortal
predicates:
There is something that is both a rabbit and an ear
The analogue of these kind of statement for the worm and stage setting is: ‘there is something
that is both a statue and a lump of clay’. Such statements were unproblematic in those contexts.
Hence, there is little temptation to regard these as inconstant predicates.
Perhaps the best line here would be to maintain that sortal predicates, as well as adjectives
such as ‘white’, are ‘positionally’ inconstant, though modally and temporally constant. We
would then give characterizations of the extension of sortals such as:
18
‘x is a rabbit’ is satisfied by A iff the fusion of A and its positional-counterparts
makes up a rabbit.
Under the ear-counterpart relation, the extension of this predicate will be empty; under the
rabbit-counterpart relation, all the atomic undetached rabbit parts will fall within it. Of course,
this doesn’t mean that there are any ordinary contexts in which ‘there are no rabbits’ would be
true: for such sentences ipso facto make salient rabbit-counterparthood. The view does allow
us to regard the Fodorian sentence above as the direct analogue of the ‘historical predicate’ or
‘modal predicate’ cases familiar from stage and worm views: just as in those cases, the diagnosis
will be that the sentence can only express a truth if there is a context-change occurring in the
middle of it.
However, why can’t the context shift in the middle of a sentence? In the temporal case,
it seemed legitimate to allow the kind of contextual shifts necessary to render true: ‘there is
something that is both a 35 year old statue and a million-year-old lump of clay’. Presumably,
that is because the use of the phrase ‘lump of clay’ in the second conjunct shifts the context to
one where lump-of-clay counterparthood is salient. If that is the case, why can’t context shift
from rabbit-counterparthood to ear-counterparthood midway through Fodor’s existential gener-
alization, rendering it true? This is the outstanding challenge to the approach just described.
Suppose we reject the response to Fodor just sketched. Then one who endorses the dot se-
mantics as a legitimate way to interpret English sentences will have to have a healthy propensity
to bite bullets. Suppose we tug on a rabbit’s ear, and say: “this is a white ear; but it is also a
mostly black rabbit”. In context, the statement seems fine. We would probably regard it as a
pun49—but for the dot theorist, it would express the sober truth.
Let us take stock. We have been considering three different ways in which our proposed
semantic theories, embedding different divisions of reference, might fail to match up with the
patterns of assent and dissent in ordinary language use. We looked at the stage theoretic treat-
ment of tense and counting, and found nothing to worry the Quinean. We then looked at issues
of compounding, and located the concerns of Evans and Fodor within the general phenomenon
of (modally, temporally or positionally) inconstant predication. Evans’s objection to Quinean
undetached rabbit-parts can be seen as exactly analogous to the concerns about modal and tem-
poral predications that are resolved by appealing to inconstant counterpart relations. The Fodo-
rian existential generalization, though superficially similar to Evans’ concerns, is now revealed
as a distinctly more worrying case.
The Fodor sentence seems a serious problem for the dot-inscrutabilist—it certainly seems
unfaithful to ordinary patterns of assent and dissent. Progress has nevertheless been made: we
have seen how Evans’ worries can be dealt with in ways exactly analogous to corresponding
problems for stage and worm theories. We have also seen exactly why the Fodorian generaliza-
tions arise: cases where one sortal applies to parts of things falling under another will generate
parallel existential generalizations and identities on all three accounts. Only in the dot case do
they seem intuitively repugnant. What I take this to show is that the Fodorian phenomena are
not symptoms of a wider malaise for dot-theory—they are the most problematic features of a
generally successful account. Perhaps more importantly, we have seen that we will not be able
to find corresponding problems with the stage view: the analogous sentences (e.g. ‘there is
something that is both a lump of clay and a statue’) are unproblematic.
49That is, one would assume that the anaphoric reference cannot be taken seriously—we would ordinarily as-
sume that we need ‘this’ and ‘it’ referring to different entities for the sentence to come out true.
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4 Conclusion
We have set out three semantic fragments that embed rival divisions of reference. This affords
us a principled position from which to assess Quine’s contention that the division of reference
is inscrutable. Objections, both ones based on those extant in the literature and some new to
that debate, can now be put forward and assessed. The sort of maneuvers already familiar
from the debate on modal and temporal operators (in particular, inconstancy in counterpart
relations) turn out to have great relevance in propounding the Quinean position. One objection
in particular turns out to be especially robust (the Fodorian objections to division of reference
over undetached parts); and our perspective allows to see this as a local manifestation of a more
general phenomenon.
What of the case for division inscrutability itself? At least in the case of stage and worm
inscrutability, I take it that we have got proposals that seem to predict the same patterns of assent
and dissent in all but recherche contexts; dot theory clearly returns more unexpected results in
non-recherche cases, though it does a good job most of the time. So the prima facie case for
division inscrutability—at least on stages/worms—looks strong.
One cannot escape this challenge simply by endorsing a more expansive metaphysics that
incorporates, say, enduring objects that one wishes to identify with ordinary persisting things,
unless one in addition disbelieves in the existence of the relevant perduring entities. For so long
as one still has worms, stages and dots within one’s ontology then one will be able to formulate
the three theories.50 The challenge will be: in virtue of what do our words pick out the enduring
entities, rather than the worms, stages and dots mentioned above?
If one wants to rebut the Quinean case for inscrutability at this point, one either needs to
bring up new examples of sentences the above accounts misclassify, or one has to elaborate the
constraints on successful interpretation over and above charity—say, constraints of causality,
simplicity, or eligibility—and make the case that somehow one or the other of these interpre-
tations violates these constraints. Whichever route you take, the debate can now be structured
around an explicit formulation of the Quinean challenge.
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